vex: comsci (crypto) lectures are the best. thanks professor alf
punkman: http://logs.nosuchlabs.com/log/asciilifeform/2021-09-11#1057565 << there is anothe way to look at this. if you run a business, or a cult, you need a "funnel" where prospects fall in. maybe it has a wide "mouth", or not so wide, but you'll have to interact with prospects and reject/train/sell them
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-11 23:18:45 billymg: http://logs.nosuchlabs.com/log/asciilifeform/2021-09-11#1057553 << which is why it's crucial to not compromise anything for the normie (it sounds like we're all in agreement on this tbh)
punkman: if your funnel is too narrow, if you don't work the funnel, you end up a lonely business/cult-man
punkman: http://logs.nosuchlabs.com/log/asciilifeform/2021-09-12#1057831 << suppose I don't have a toilet-box where to run experimental network software. now I need to find a provider, buy vps, set it up, manage the thing. The vps costs $5 month, whatever no big deal, but it also costs time and space in head.
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-12 23:45:20 vex: If you can't afford shoelaces, you can't afford shoes
PeterL: What is the downside to having an intermitent connection? Is there a reason everybody needs to have a complete history?
asciilifeform: PeterL: see thread. (summary: 'selfchain' feature for distinguishing 'true' nick from a squatter relies on being able to see an unbroken chain of 'i'm the one who previously said x')
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-12 19:21:26 asciilifeform: thinking again about 'getdata' : this won't work as given. because if timestamp indicates 'stale' (>15min in the past) the answer to the 'getdata' will be tossed.
asciilifeform: (this in re: hearsay -- messages directly received from a peer, with his handle in'em, are prima facie authentic)
asciilifeform: http://logs.nosuchlabs.com/log/asciilifeform/2021-09-13#1057837 << you don't strictly speaking ~need~ a proper box; point was that certain imho key features of the protocol won't work as intended, fork alarm will go off regularly on your station, and you'll end up silencing it, losing the mechanism effectively, and eventually suffering the problem it is
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-13 05:29:27 punkman: http://logs.nosuchlabs.com/log/asciilifeform/2021-09-12#1057831 << suppose I don't have a toilet-box where to run experimental network software. now I need to find a provider, buy vps, set it up, manage the thing. The vps costs $5 month, whatever no big deal, but it also costs time and space in head.
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-06 00:30:43 asciilifeform: they're there to 1) solve the 'cocks problem' 2) support, in future, usenet-style threading.
asciilifeform: meant to defend against.
asciilifeform: on top of this, people will send you PMs which go to /dev/null with no indication or warning
asciilifeform: and you, similarly, to others
PeterL: I suppose your ack method guards against PM's silently going to /dev/null
asciilifeform: PeterL: ACKs are going away.
asciilifeform: they're a massive waste of bw and entirely redundant when we have 'getdata'
asciilifeform: punkman: without reasonably-stable connection, you will not reliably track unbroken selfchains. and so will have exactly 0 ability to distinguish genuine from fraudulent hearsay msgs.
asciilifeform: if anyone can think of a 'have the cake and eat it' solution (aside from the unavailable, at line rate, constant-time rsa) i'm all ears.
PeterL: nothing stops people from saying "got it" after getting a message, but that does not need to go into the protocol
asciilifeform: PeterL: indeed
asciilifeform: you need either reliable delivery, or gap filling, for maintaining selfchain integrity tho
asciilifeform: the latter imho is preferable (getdata).
PeterL: if I know I have been offline for a while, then I can assume I will have missed some selfchain from anybody who talked, so should there be a mechanism for ignoring the forking at the inial connection?
asciilifeform: PeterL: right, but you'll ignore it enuff of the time that the feature may as well not exist for you.
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-13 10:44:24 asciilifeform: http://logs.nosuchlabs.com/log/asciilifeform/2021-09-13#1057837 << you don't strictly speaking ~need~ a proper box; point was that certain imho key features of the protocol won't work as intended, fork alarm will go off regularly on your station, and you'll end up silencing it, losing the mechanism effectively, and eventually suffering the problem it is
PeterL: and if I have been offline then I would not have been talking, so it should not affect other people's expected selfchain from me
asciilifeform: asciilifeform's aim was to come up with some means to enforce nick exclusivity on a 100% p2p net. this may be 'fried ice' and impossible in the general case. but i certainly have no desire to live on a net where there is NO ability to distinguish an original from a squatter.
asciilifeform: PeterL: you can talk without knowing that you're offline.
asciilifeform: bang, you've broken yer selfchain ~for everyone~.
PeterL: heh, I guess that is true
PeterL: so then when I reconnect everybody would use "getdata" to see what they missed. Would they then re-broadcast the old messages?
asciilifeform: PeterL: understand, we have what genrich altshuller referred to as an 'engineering contradiction'. where e.g. you need a stick to be both long and short somehow at the same time; a pan to be both hot and cold; etc. superficially can't be done -- but sometimes MUST.
dulapbot: (trilema) 2019-05-31 asciilifeform: not read whole thing, but appears to be inspired by altshuller's 'triz' , which in fact not a crock of shit, and asciilifeform personally uses.
asciilifeform: in this case we need rsa. but we can't use rsa.
asciilifeform: the entire pest algo is an attempt.
asciilifeform: (at 'resolving the contradiction'.)
asciilifeform will be back shortly
billymg: asciilifeform: your www's select mechanism has a bug where it also strips off the post id upon deselect
billymg: at least on this chromium version i'm currently using
asciilifeform: billymg: well-known bug
asciilifeform: billymg: if you've a fix, plox to write in
asciilifeform: billymg: seems to work!! ty!
billymg: asciilifeform: np. it felt like your site was gaslighting me, i kept wondering if perhaps at some point i had hit the back button and didn't remember
asciilifeform: billymg: ancient bug, inherited from the original (from archive.is, via mp's rip)
asciilifeform: continuing this puzzler-thread : 'impostor' and 'original' are not always even applicable :
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-13 10:40:59 asciilifeform: PeterL: see thread. (summary: 'selfchain' feature for distinguishing 'true' nick from a squatter relies on being able to see an unbroken chain of 'i'm the one who previously said x')
asciilifeform: ... given that two previously-disjoint nets may merge , there can be nick collisions resulting from said merge w/out necessarily any malfeasance on anyone's part
asciilifeform: ( a spec-compliant noad will not permit two+ direct peers having colliding canonical (i.e. recorded in WOT) handles. but is powerless to prevent the use of whatever handles, incl. colliding, in hearsay msgs )
asciilifeform firmly stuck on this issue, cannot proceed w/ this work until satisfactory solution is found
asciilifeform: punkman signpost billymg thimbronion et al ^
asciilifeform: http://logs.nosuchlabs.com/log/asciilifeform/2021-09-13#1057866 << forgot to answer this -- doesn't work in the >15min case, recall.
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-13 10:57:33 PeterL: so then when I reconnect everybody would use "getdata" to see what they missed. Would they then re-broadcast the old messages?
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-12 19:21:26 asciilifeform: thinking again about 'getdata' : this won't work as given. because if timestamp indicates 'stale' (>15min in the past) the answer to the 'getdata' will be tossed.
punkman: asciilifeform: sort of feels like inverse of "tin woman" probem, where we are so poor, we are trying to figure out optimal way to fuck can of beans
asciilifeform: punkman: imho virtually all real-world engineering falls into this category
asciilifeform: in practice the avail. materiel inevitably much closer to can of beans than the desired antigrav unobtainium.
asciilifeform: for instance, satellite biz still relies on strapping the 100-200M$ hand-made machine to a gigantic bomb...
asciilifeform: so yes indeed, asciilifeform is searching for 'optimal way to fuck a can of beans' and invites others to participate.
asciilifeform: cuz the alternative is, what, vodka and death.
punkman: my point being, if we are "fucking can of beans", maybe not to worry too much about selfchains and forkage at this point
asciilifeform: punkman: i'm uninterested in baking another irc.
asciilifeform: 100% uninterested.
asciilifeform: 100% ddos and sybilproof or fuckyou.
punkman: we can only verify msg from direct peer, there is no magic way to verify hearsay for free
asciilifeform: at the same time gotta.
asciilifeform: otherwise, punkman , we have the star topology again
asciilifeform: i.e. zero useful communication except between direct peers.
asciilifeform: such a net would have precious little redundancy/resilience, and, importantly, almost impossible to grow to any interesting size without exponential explosion of overhead
punkman: but we've already established "if peer sends shit hearsay messages, unpeer/gag/whatever"
asciilifeform: punkman: how do you know they're shit ?
punkman: mostly own eyes
asciilifeform: aha, and if not obvious to eyes ?
asciilifeform: and, say, this case. what, 'it won't happen' ?? and if it does ?
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-13 13:12:22 asciilifeform: ... given that two previously-disjoint nets may merge , there can be nick collisions resulting from said merge w/out necessarily any malfeasance on anyone's part
asciilifeform: prayer is not a valid engineering component.
punkman: how would nets join?
asciilifeform: punkman: say asciilifeform has peers a,b,c. punkman has peers x,y,z. asciilifeform and punkman became peers.
asciilifeform: c and z are both 'nebuchadnezzar'.
asciilifeform: now we have a hot mess.
punkman: why would we do this?
asciilifeform: what do you mean 'why' ?
asciilifeform: you peered with someone. he had existing peers.
punkman: if I join separate net, I don't bring peers with me
asciilifeform: they are now your l2.
asciilifeform: sure as fuck you do.
asciilifeform: via hearsay.
asciilifeform: it aint separate, is the thing
asciilifeform: you've added a peer to a net of yours. he had existing peers of his own.
asciilifeform: ( you can of course join separate nets, operated via separate pestrons. this is explicitly not the item under discussion tho )
punkman: wait, so you run dulapnet, I run whorenet with 50 whores, why would you want me to bring the whores to dulapnet
asciilifeform: punkman: likely you wouldn't. but in many cases involving sumthing other than obvious disjunction as with whores -- you may want to
asciilifeform: this is part of the [file:///home/stas/pest/FD/b/pest_spec/pest.html#122-nets-instead-of-channels][explicitly specified!!!] model of net growth.
asciilifeform: and, separately, broadcast messages. are. part. of . the. spec. meaning, even if packet from asciilifeform to punkman is lost, he will still get the message via 11 whatever other people.
asciilifeform: i.e. non-star topology.
asciilifeform: that message is to be distinguishable from noise.
asciilifeform: exactly HOW to do this, remains to be seen. but it aint a question of 'whether'. it's a question of 'who wants to climb down from the fucking trees -- must find how to do this.'
punkman: if we forget about packet size limitation, I suppose message could contain N encrypted copies, one for each peer, and hearsay broadcast now has meaningful sig for recipient, even if not received directly
asciilifeform: punkman: 'onions'. this falls immediately, we have exactly 508 bytes.
asciilifeform: for this reason.
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-11 12:42:33 asciilifeform: permitting reassembly is an allcomers hole -- given as you can't authenticate the frags.
asciilifeform: it's a permanent limit for so long as we're on earthling arpa-derived net.
asciilifeform: even if packets could be MBs in size, this'd be nonsense, it doesn't scale to even coupla dozen peers
asciilifeform: because, again, ANY incoming packet has to be handled fast enuff to allow rejection of martians at line rate.
asciilifeform: this problem will have to be SOLVED, punkman . until someone solves it, nice things cannot be had.
asciilifeform: not hand-waved around, no. solved.
asciilifeform: http://logs.nosuchlabs.com/log/asciilifeform/2021-09-13#1057928 << lol, pasted local draft, let's redo :
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-13 14:29:32 asciilifeform: this is part of the [file:///home/stas/pest/FD/b/pest_spec/pest.html#122-nets-instead-of-channels][explicitly specified!!!] model of net growth.
asciilifeform: ... explicitly specified!!! model of net growth.
asciilifeform: 'A broadcast message is sent to every member of a station's net. Nets may easily and organically undergo schismatic splits, or, on the contrary, combine into larger nets, whenever the individual station operators so desire.'
asciilifeform: this is not optional.
asciilifeform: in so far as asciilifeform can see, the only way to maintain a reasonably hard identity without asymmetric crypto, is to have a public, unbroken chain of 'i'm the one who wrote X' going all the way back to the 1st message ever sent by $speaker, where he had a pgpgram.
asciilifeform: this however requires having the unbroken chain.
asciilifeform: ( btw in the original unpublished draft, there was a ~third~ field, 'xorchain', containing the xor of all the message hashes from the speaker from t==0. asciilifeform removed it, because while useful adjunct to selfchain, does not actually resolve the fundamental headaches of it )
asciilifeform ftr NOT INTERESTED in 'make yet-another chat like all the others'. interested STRICTLY in resolving the fundamental problem once and fucking for all.
asciilifeform will post various unpublished/rejected crapola from chalkboard, in hopes that it will stimulate other folx to think :
asciilifeform: ... eh nm, perhaps later.
asciilifeform does not want to get people stuck in same mathematical dead end as himself
punkman: it seems to me that any solution that is not "find way to live with hearsay", will amount to pubkeycryptosystem
asciilifeform: punkman: the stick gotta be both long and short. hot and cold.
asciilifeform: asciilifeform already proposed one solution, which by all rights 'ought not be possible', it simply relies on reliable net connectivity for all parties.
asciilifeform: there oughta be another.
asciilifeform: you somehow gotta be able to leverage the fact that direct-peer msgs are ipso facto authentic.
punkman: "unbroken chain of 'i'm the one who wrote X' going all the way back to the 1st message" << is this a solution? I send message on Friday, then go fishing for weekend. anyone else can start growing this "unbroken chain" with hearsay messages
asciilifeform: punkman: and then the genuine punkman shows up
asciilifeform: so, to work, gotta be able to detect fork of arbitrary length.
asciilifeform: either that, or -- from asciilifeform's chalkboard -- erry message includes 2 additional 256bit fields . one is H256(R) where R is a rng turd. the other is the R from previous.
asciilifeform: a message not carrying correct R is immediately known to be fraudulent.
asciilifeform: this scheme is however vulnerable to mitm, anyone who is able to read a message's successor can generate a variant message, because knows the requisite R.
asciilifeform: however it does solve the 'fishing problem' described by punkman .
asciilifeform: i.e. no one can 'extend the chain' without knowing the not-yet-revealed R.
asciilifeform: (from the pov, of course, of those who received the most recent genuine msg from punkman .)
asciilifeform: may as well post the other chalkboardism :
punkman: it's the same problem again, so you commit to secret for next broadcast msg, the commitment only good for direct peers
asciilifeform: ... K gets an additional 256bit component, G; and msgs get an additional 256b field, SG. G is shared with all peers; SG is HMAC signature using G. all of your peers can now authenticate (or impersonate) your hearsay.
asciilifeform: punkman: the commitment would be impervious for direct peers, and ~pretty good~ for indirect
asciilifeform: but still imho ugly hack.
cgra: asciilifeform: pardon if i missed something, but: where do you end up, if handles aren't "first names of various people" and hence eventually collide, but specify 'must be properly random string min x characters'? -- and perhaps deal with the nicknaming issue on each console's end instead
asciilifeform: cgra: they'd be obv. less likely to collide by happenstance. but what about when deliberately ?
asciilifeform: the way asciilifeform sees it, the situation of deliberate collision probably cannot be ~prevented~. but it MUST be ~detectable~.
asciilifeform: the other thing, cgra , is that one MUST be able to receive meaningful messages from l2 (and optinally l3 etc.) this requires human-readable handles inside msgs.
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-13 14:45:28 asciilifeform: ... explicitly specified!!! model of net growth.
asciilifeform: *optionally
punkman: SG tells me that one from group signed the hearsay, but I already know this, peer signed and peer is from group
asciilifeform: punkman: it'd be for the case where e.g. asciilifeform is talking but for some reason his packets cannot reach punkman , but can reach e.g. signpost .
cgra: asciilifeform: this 'handle must not collide' kinda got me thinking every Joe must be separately introduced to me before the name carries a specific enough meaning
asciilifeform: i.e. the non-star topology
asciilifeform: cgra: at the same time a net oughta be able to contain a 'joe'.
asciilifeform: but ~no other station~ on the net can at any point be a 'joe'.
asciilifeform: this case has to be handled correctly, always.
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-13 14:25:56 asciilifeform: punkman: say asciilifeform has peers a,b,c. punkman has peers x,y,z. asciilifeform and punkman became peers.
asciilifeform: even if 'c' and 'z' are both 'joe'.
asciilifeform: for one thing, there's no way to even know about this apriori.
cgra: asciilifeform: which part of spec should i look at again, to grasp how the deliberate handle collision would possibly happen, if otherwise issue mitigated by random handles? or, if you can work a simple example for me
asciilifeform: cgra: suppose that for whatever reason, a packet or series of packets from asciilifeform is able to reach only signpost and punkman . at the same time asciilifeform is addressing his entire net ;
asciilifeform: meanwhile packets from cgra are able to reach asciilifeform's entire net. cgra has a peer 'nebuchadnezzar', who is not a peer of asciilifeform or anyone else currently on dulapnet. nebuchadnezzar is peer with shalmaneser, who also not peer w/ anyone else. the latter decides to impersonate asciilifeform.
asciilifeform: so when the genuine asciilifeform speaks , folx see ' asciilifeform(signpost) : .... ' and asciilifeform(punkman) : ....'
asciilifeform: when the sham asciilifeform speaks, people will see ' asciilifeform(cgra) : surrender to reich with me! ' or similar.
asciilifeform: without something like the unbroken-chain scheme, it is impossible for anyone, incl. asciilifeform's l1, to distinguish the sham from the genuine.
asciilifeform: i.e. without authenticable (in any sense) hearsay, we have a star topology again. where the only packets that can have any meaning are such that are sent between direct peers.
asciilifeform: ... in the above case, the genuine and the sham are at least in ~some~ way distinct. but suppose that both are connected to the net via same peer !
asciilifeform: this is easy to picture, i will omit explicitly drawing it.
asciilifeform: punkman: returning to your 'fishing' example -- one way to distinguish a genuine from a squatter broadcast is that the latter will nearly inevitably get relayed by ~only one~ peer
asciilifeform: whereas the genuine -- sends to his l1 ~simultaneously
asciilifeform: there oughta be a way to make use of this fact.
asciilifeform: it is exceedingly unlikely that e.g. asciilifeform will have to carry out a broadcast by hearsaying through ONE thin path into the net.
cgra: asciilifeform: "all my buddies say asciilifeform said so" vs "cgra said nebuchadnezzar said asciilifeform said otherwise", kinda fits the 'hearsay' term
asciilifeform: right, but how to mechanize.
asciilifeform: remember, per current spec, the messages are deduped
asciilifeform: so you will never see , on your console, the same message from multiple paths.
punkman: http://logs.nosuchlabs.com/log/asciilifeform/2021-09-13#1058001 <> http://logs.nosuchlabs.com/log/asciilifeform/2021-09-13#1057985
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-13 15:51:11 asciilifeform: it is exceedingly unlikely that e.g. asciilifeform will have to carry out a broadcast by hearsaying through ONE thin path into the net.
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-13 15:26:08 asciilifeform: this case has to be handled correctly, always.
asciilifeform: punkman: the potential legitimate prior existence of two asciilifeforms is a separate (tho related) problem.
asciilifeform will post, for completeness, the last of the chalkboardisms :
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-13 14:25:56 asciilifeform: punkman: say asciilifeform has peers a,b,c. punkman has peers x,y,z. asciilifeform and punkman became peers.
asciilifeform: suppose that any message having a variant netchain from the receiver's value is rejected.
asciilifeform must brb
asciilifeform: sooo punkman , cgra , et al: let's try this 'solution' on for size :
asciilifeform: a hearsay message is received; and there may be a certain number of duplicates of it received, in a defined time window (refer as Td.) normally we simply throw'em away and forget about'em. but suppose they get ~counted~
asciilifeform: lemma : a station can only receive as many duplicates of message M, such that have a bounce==1, as it has peers.
asciilifeform: per this lemma, you now have a useful number associated with any hearsay message : the # of peers from whom a dupe of said message , having bounce <= 1, was NOT received.
asciilifeform: if this number (call it B... bogosity?) != 0, it is displayed in parens following the handle(peer) string.
asciilifeform: e.g. in this example, if you received gen1 dupes of the msg from all but 2 of your peers, you will see e.g. ' asciilifeform(signpost)(-2) : ... '
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-13 15:33:11 asciilifeform: so when the genuine asciilifeform speaks , folx see ' asciilifeform(signpost) : .... ' and asciilifeform(punkman) : ....'
asciilifeform: but if in fact one of, say, shinohai's camwhores is impersonating asciilifeform , you will see ' asciilifeform(shinohai)(-12) ' supposing you have 13 peers.
asciilifeform: there may be a cleaner algo to make use of the simultaneous burst of genuine msg. but i suspect will be minor variation on the above theme.
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-13 15:49:09 asciilifeform: whereas the genuine -- sends to his l1 ~simultaneously
asciilifeform: imho oughta be used ~in conjunction~ with selfchain, rather than in place.
asciilifeform invites comments
asciilifeform proposes a value of 1s for 'Td' .
asciilifeform: in fact already specified this in 4.1.2.2.2. In-WOT Hearsay. simply, now also count the # of peers from whom got bounce<=1 dupes of a given msg.
asciilifeform: station operator could configure a minimal bogosity that triggers the (-xx) . or see any where != 0. entirely matter of taste.
asciilifeform: could even reject in-wot hearsay with bogosity over $threshold entirely.
asciilifeform: ... if you got ~more~ dupes than you have peers, you now know that you have a traitor in your wot, who sent a bogon with bounce==0.
asciilifeform: i.e. an attempted impersonation by someone in the victim's l1.
asciilifeform: anyways will attempt a more rigorous formulation of the algo laters.
asciilifeform bbl
punkman: one problem is that all messages from poorly connected station, will have high bogosity
asciilifeform: his problem.
asciilifeform: and imho entirely appropriate. want folx to see low bogometer reading? peer with moar people in that net.
asciilifeform: meanwhile lurkers write in.
asciilifeform: apparently subject interests moar folx than simply dulapnet denizens...
asciilifeform genuinely bbl
asciilifeform: for future ref, the proposed pill. (btw billymg seems that you broke multiline highlight in your css...)
asciilifeform equally at fault, tsk, signed w/out fully testing
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-13 16:25:46 asciilifeform: sooo punkman , cgra , et al: let's try this 'solution' on for size :
billymg: asciilifeform: will fix, i didn't know multiline highlight was a feature even
asciilifeform: billymg: it has been since almost the start; but is awkward to use (have to form the url by hand)
billymg: asciilifeform: i have the fix, it's a oneliner
asciilifeform: 1moar refinement to the scheme -- only count as bogowitnesses (peers who did NOT bring a dupe of the hearsay msg) such peers as, within last 15m, have sent in ~anything~ (let's define'em as 'online'.)
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-13 16:28:23 asciilifeform: per this lemma, you now have a useful number associated with any hearsay message : the # of peers from whom a dupe of said message , having bounce <= 1, was NOT received.
asciilifeform: billymg: hm?
billymg: for the multiline select highlight
asciilifeform: billymg: let's have it ( and vpatch at billymg's leisure )
billymg: asciilifeform: http://paste.deedbot.org/?id=wZuk
asciilifeform: billymg: worx! ty!
billymg: asciilifeform: np
billymg: specificity issue, apologies for the oversight
asciilifeform: no worry
billymg: asciilifeform: i've started working on a sort of marketing page for pest at http://pest.bitdash.io/ -- right now the homepage just links to a neatly formatted copy of the current draft spec, but next step is adding an "overview" button to the homepage that will lead to a powerpoint-esque summary with diagrams/visual aids
asciilifeform: nifty, billymg , ty for mirroring !
asciilifeform: billymg: i've been hoping to bake diagrams of key mechanisms (svg?) but nfi when will get to.
asciilifeform: billymg: if you like that kind of thing please feel welcome to try your hand at it
asciilifeform promises to review
asciilifeform: billymg: i like the pretty-printing ; if you want to share your script for generating this from the .md -- plox to vpatch, i'ma make use of it in subsequent updates
asciilifeform: indeed it is easier on the eyes. (esp. vs the mutilation which appears on asciilifeform's www when pasting in the output of 'markdown2')
billymg: asciilifeform: ty, all i did was view-source on your www and copy/pasted the html you had generated
billymg: the rest is just different css applied
asciilifeform: a hm
billymg: (with very very minor html adjustments only when absolutely necessary)
asciilifeform: billymg: see the makefile btw, it's straight output from 'markdown2'
billymg: asciilifeform: will check it out, the view-source, copy/paste was just a quick and dirty method
asciilifeform: ftr markdown is a rancid piece of shit and barely usable.
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-07-11 19:26:49 asciilifeform: meanwhile, asciilifeform went 'can use a footnote >1nce in 'markdown' formatter ?' -- apparently not! and the fuckwads/'maintainers' are proud!'
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-07-11 19:37:41 asciilifeform: or say i want to rename a section, or insert one between existing sections.
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-07-11 19:37:49 asciilifeform: now have to manually change 9000+ links? WHY?
asciilifeform: a civilized replacement (sexprs!!!) for 'markdown' would be an a++ noob project.
asciilifeform: sane handling of section names, numbering, endnotes, backlinks, table of contents...
asciilifeform: 'if wishes were horses'
billymg: asciilifeform: someday...
asciilifeform thinking further re the algo -- can be simplified as follows :
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-13 16:25:46 asciilifeform: sooo punkman , cgra , et al: let's try this 'solution' on for size :
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-13 16:43:42 asciilifeform: i.e. an attempted impersonation by someone in the victim's l1.
asciilifeform: 2) ~every~ hearsay message (rather than strictly in-wot hearsay) is embargoed for a configurable interval.
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-13 16:36:56 asciilifeform: proposes a value of 1s for 'Td' .
asciilifeform: 3) within this interval, the number of distinct peers who sent a bounces==1 duplicate of the message is counted.
dulapbot: Logged on 2021-09-13 16:38:33 asciilifeform: in fact already specified this in 4.1.2.2.2. In-WOT Hearsay. simply, now also count the # of peers from whom got bounce<=1 dupes of a given msg.
asciilifeform: 4) if this number is 3 or less, the message is displayed in the format e.g. ' asciilifeform(cgra,signpost,punkman): .... ' where the handles in the parens are the peers who sent in the bounces==1 hearsay copies of the msg
asciilifeform: ... if the number is 4 or more, then the format ' asciilifeform(4): .... ' is used.
asciilifeform: ^ oughta be configurable on station, the exact value is an aesthetic preference.
asciilifeform: the count represents simply the number of distinguishable 'simultaneous' (w/in ~1s) paths which the message took to reach your console.
asciilifeform: nao a forgery would need to be injected via the peripheral (i.e. non-common) peers of N of your peers ~simultaneously~, to have a shot of fooling you.
asciilifeform: on top of this, we retain the selfchain mechanism, which continues to work a++ for folx who have decent net connections.
asciilifeform sees this as adequate solution ; invites comment. and will bbl.